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Music in the Digital Age: An Analysis of Declining Revenue in the U.S. Recorded Music 
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At its height, the U.S. recorded music industry brought in annual revenue of $20 
billion.  Since the turn of the 21st century, there has been a dramatic decline in recorded 
music revenue, to a level of $7.6 billion in 2016.  What has been the cause of this sharp 
decline?  In this paper, I hypothesize that technological advancement and the rise of 
music piracy via file-sharing technologies have been the primary instruments of this 
decline.  I find empirical evidence that technological advancement is associated with 
downward pressure on recorded music revenue but find ambiguous results to the impact 
of music piracy.  I reconcile these findings with a summary of a growing expanse of 
literature that suggests on net, music piracy has a negative impact on aggregate recorded 
music revenue, though the literature is inconclusive as to the magnitude of this effect.  I 
conclude with suggestions of future research directions to determine the full effects of 
digitization on musician and consumer welfare. 
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The U.S. recorded music industry brought in $20 billion dollars of revenue per 
year at its height. However, since its peak in the year 1999, revenue has been drastically 
declining, with total recorded music revenue around $7 billion in the year 2016.  While 
revenue has declined, total units of recorded music sold have increased dramatically from 
2004 to 2016.  Basic economic theory intuits the price of music must be decreasing—
higher quantities sold with lower revenues is consistent with lower prices per unit being 
offered in the market.  Figure 1 illustrates revenue data as obtained from the Recording 
Industry Association of America (RIAA) over the timespan 1973 to 2016, while Figure 2 
illustrates unit sales over the same time.  Each shade is representative of a different type 
of medium through which recorded music can be obtained by the consumer.  Figure 3 
depicts a rudimentary calculation of the average price of a unit of recorded music found 
by dividing total revenue in each year by respective unit sales.  These figures provide a 
visual for the general underpinnings of this paper.  
Key events and developments in the recorded music industry are denoted on the 
figures.  Napster, LimeWire, and PirateBay are online peer-to-peer file sharing networks 
that facilitate the unauthorized transfer of copyrighted files, or piracy.  The release of 
Apple, Inc.’s iPod mobile music device and iTunes digital distribution platform occurred 
in the early 2000s which were both important technological improvements that increased 
the ease of accessing music.  These developments will be discussed in detail in a later 


















The legal developments labeled on the figures refer to two lawsuits brought 
against the five major record label grounds and music retailers in 2000 by 40 states and 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) which charged the organizations with conspiracy to 
fix CD prices.  The suits were supported by an FTC investigation that estimated price 
fixing practices cost consumers more than $480 million.  In May 2000, the FTC settled 
their suit with decrees requiring the defendants to cease use of policies that required 
stores to advertise CDs at or above a set price in return for promotional funding (MTV 
News Staff 2000).  In 2002, the record labels and retailers settled the federal suit, 
agreeing to refund $67.4 million to consumers who purchased CDs from 1995 to 2000 
and donate 5.5 million CDs, valued at $75.7 million, to state organizations to be 
distributed to schools, libraries, and other nonprofit groups (Deutsch 2002).  Further, in 
2003, the RIAA filed 261 lawsuits against individuals who had each distributed an 
average of more than 1,000 copyrighted music files via online file-sharing networks, in 
addition to several other lawsuits against suspected music pirates (La Monica 2003).  
These legal events could have had a material impact on recorded music revenue, sales, 
and piracy of music products; as such, have been denoted on Figures 1 through 3 for ease 
of reference. 
While the initial conclusion of falling prices in the last 15 years can be derived 
from Figure 3, it is flawed as the distribution of mediums apparent in Figures 1 and 2 
complicates the narrative and provides a basis for econometric modeling and analysis.  
As can be observed from the color-coded keys, the landscape of the music industry has 
changed significantly not only since the turn of the century, but also since recorded music 
mediums and sales were first tracked and categorized by the RIAA starting in 1973.  This 
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shifting landscape has been amplified by rapid technological progress which now allows 
consumers to easily access a wide variety of databases containing hundreds of thousands 
of music audio files.   
In addition, technology has exponentially increased the ease of piracy.  Piracy 
occurs when copyrighted files are shared between individuals, sometimes distributed 
widely, from those who may have legally purchased the good to those who have not paid 
for the good in the recorded music market.  Generally, piracy is a colloquial term for 
copyright infringement, which is the violation of copyright law.  Copyright grants 
exclusive rights to creators of original works (17 U.S.C. §§ 102-106, 2016).  When 
copyright is violated, the owner of the exclusive rights can pursue legal action: typically, 
through remedies in civil court; however, criminal charges may be filed if the 
infringement was committed for private financial gain or with the goal of reproducing or 
distributing the infringed material (17 U.S.C. §§ 501-506, 2016). 
In this paper, I investigate the impact that technological advancement has had on 
revenue in the recorded music industry.  As observed in Figures 1 and 2, the landscape of 
the industry is rapidly changing in the face of technology and this paper is an inquiry into 
the relationship between technological advancement and recorded music revenue.  In 
addition, I attempt to model the effects of music piracy and file sharing on recorded 
music revenue, an illegal activity amplified by the Internet.  In a report conducted by the 
Institute for Policy Innovation advertised on the RIAA website, the economic losses to 
the sound recording industry are estimated to be $5.33 billion, losses to U.S. worker 
earnings are estimated to be $2.7 billion, and lost tax revenue to U.S. federal, state, and 
local governments is estimated to be at least $422 million (Siwek 2007).  Thus, the 
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impact of piracy is claimed to be substantial and warrants econometric investigation.  
Finally, I test the specific effect that digital music mediums have on total revenue in the 
industry.   
I find that technological innovation has had downward pressure on revenue in the 
recorded music industry but find ambiguous results from piracy and file sharing in my 
empirical analysis.  Additionally, I find that the shift from physical music mediums to 
digital music mediums is associated with downward pressure on the price of music, 
representing the idea that digital mediums carry a lower price than physical mediums and 
supporting the trend displayed in Figure 3.  The remainder of the paper proceeds as 
follows: Section 2 reviews the existing theoretical and empirical literature on piracy and 
recorded music sales and revenue.  Section 3 outlines the research design and 
methodology as well as reviews the data used.  Section 4 contains the empirical analysis 
and discusses the results.  Section 5 offers a summary and concluding remarks. 
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II. Review of Related Literature 
The impact of piracy and file sharing on recorded music is a difficult 
measurement to make, given the sparse availability of data depicting illegal music 
transactions.  File-sharing networks rarely share downloading data, and it is impractical 
and perhaps impossible to accurately measure piracy conducted in offline markets.  As 
such, estimating the effects of piracy on recorded music sales and revenue is a tricky task 
that requires a solid theoretical base and statistical finesse.  Luckily, there exists a 
sizeable body of work focused on tackling the challenge of estimating piracy’s impact on 
the recorded music industry.  Here I will review the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature concerning this topic to determine what effects other economists have both 
postulated and found empirical support for.  First, I will examine the theoretical 
component elements of piracy.  In the following subsection, I will summarize a growing 
expanse of empirical work to determine if a consensus exists regarding the magnitude 
and direction of piracy’s effect on recorded music sales and revenue. 
 
A. Theoretical Considerations 
Hui and Png (2003) document two distinct positive influences of legitimate music 
demand by piracy.  The first is the potential of demand-side influences.  Some individuals 
simply like to consume the same item as others, and thus the quantity demanded by a 
typical consumer is positively related to quantities demanded by other consumers (Becker 
1991).  Thus, consumers of music may benefit from indirect or direct network 
externalities through the consumption of music.  A network externality exists if consumer 
utility for a product increases as the number of users grow (Conner & Rumelt 1991).  In 
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the case of software usage, as Conner and Rumelt (1991) investigate, the more users who 
use a software program, the more useful it becomes on a wider scale.  A good example of 
this phenomenon would be the widespread domination of word processing software by 
Microsoft Word—life is easier trading text files if all parties involved are using the same 
processing program.  In the case of recorded music, it is unlikely network externalities 
are factors of ease-of-use as in software, and shared value is likely the primary driver.  
The second major positive influence suggested by Hui and Png are supply-side effects 
that benefit the legitimate producer.  These largely take the form of a concept known as 
indirect appropriability, which is discussed later.  Hui and Png also note the possibility of 
sampling effects, which is also discussed later. 
Liebowitz (2005, 2006) echoes the necessity of derivation of shared value for 
network effects to exist.  Theoretically, file sharing is likely to increase the number of 
music listeners as the practice provides access to those unwilling to pay for the legitimate 
good.  With more listeners of music, the value of music for all individuals, regardless of 
whether they consume legally or illegal, would rise and those who consume legally 
would purchase more music.  Thus, for network effects to promote increased sales of 
music, all consumers must derive value from the consumption of music by others.  If this 
connection is severed, the network effects are lost and those music files that are obtained 
illegally will have no impact on the demand for music files by legitimate consumers.  
Additionally, Liebowitz argues, there exists ambiguity in the effect of possible network 
externalities when isolating global effects from local effects.  If shared value drives these 
effects, it is likely local network effects, as in exchanges between colleagues, friends, and 
family, may drive the brunt of any possible demand-side influence.  Any global network 
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effects are likely already observable through radio play of music recordings.  Finally, it 
remains to be examined if network effects have the impact of shifting output between 
existing music goods or the impact of changing the overall size of the market by driving 
demand for new recorded music. 
Besides network externalities, the other predominant positive demand-side 
influence of piracy on music sales seen in the literature is known as the sampling effect.  
The sampling effect is widely discussed (Liebowitz 2005, 2006; Hui & Png 2003, 
Waldfogel 2012; Peitz & Waelbroeck 2004; Gopal et al. 2006; Oberholzer-Gee & 
Strumpf 2007; Lee 2018) and it can be described theoretically as follows.  Music is an 
experience good, that is, the consumer does not have accurate information on the quality 
of the good before purchasing it.  A consumer does not know the true value of the music 
recording until after the initial consumption of the recording.  As such, there is an 
inherent amount of risk in the decision to purchase a music recording due to the 
uncertainty in the product’s value, and this risk may prevent some risk averse consumers 
from purchasing the good, even those with a higher willingness to pay relative to the 
market price that would receive consumer surplus from consumption.  Additionally, some 
consumers may purchase the good and be unsatisfied with the value after the initial 
consumption.  Thus, the condition of asymmetric information prevents standard utility 
maximization.  However, with the introduction of piracy to the model, a consumer may 
now sample the music recording for a much lower cost by downloading it illegally off a 
file-sharing network.  Now being able to sample at a cost of essentially zero, the 
consumer could determine the value of the good prior to purchase and decide with 
symmetric information, resulting in utility maximization and an efficient market 
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outcome.  This theoretical framework is tested in several empirical studies documented in 
the following subsection. 
Sampling may also benefit music demand through interactions with network 
effects.  An individual that samples a music product may relay the information gained 
through sampling to social connections.  If those social connections are consumption-
marginal, the new information presented may elicit consumption that may not have 
otherwise occurred.  This effect may disseminate through the social networks of each 
consumer, and the information obtained from the one instance of sampling may result in 
widespread consumption by consumption-marginal agents that may not have consumed 
the music product when it first became available (Lee 2018).  Thus, the sampling effect 
and network externalities may be interrelated. There exists some empirical evidence 
investigating this theoretical claim, which will be discussed later. 
An element that may alter the effect of sampling via file sharing on legitimate 
music sales takes the form of the superstar phenomenon.  The superstar effect discusses 
how a superstar, i.e. an extremely popular individual in the field, may owe his or her 
status to a combination of intrinsic elements of talent, extrinsic elements of circumstance 
(luck), and user expectations derived from past performance (Rosen 1981).  These 
elements work in conjunction with a general desire by consumers to minimize the search 
and sampling costs that are necessary to overcome the challenges created by asymmetric 
information (Alder 1985).  Thus, the difficulty to judge the value of music created by 
relatively unknown artists and the statistical tendency of consumers to correlate past 
performance with future outcomes lead to a few superstars dominating the market, as the 
existing knowledge of those prominent artists reduces sampling costs (MacDonald 1988).  
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However, by reducing sampling costs effectively to zero through the introduction of 
piracy to the model, we may observe changes to the superstar effect.  This is tangentially 
discussed in the empirical literature. 
Besides network externalities and the sampling effect, a third, less well-
documented positive influence has been discussed theoretically.  This is the impact of 
indirect appropriability.  This concept was first developed in Liebowitz (1985) regarding 
effects first observed in the copying of academic journals.  The idea is that an increase in 
demand might be observed for the originals from which copies are made as those making 
the copies capture some of the value from those receiving the copies and in turn transfer 
this value into their demand for the originals they purchase.  However, for this theory to 
work, the variability in the number of copies must be small, or the seller must be able to 
distinguish which original products are primarily being used for copies.  Liebowitz 
examines this effect as it applies to academic journals, hypothesizing that the most 
photocopied copyrighted materials are journals and the heaviest photocopying of journals 
takes place in libraries.  Thus, publishers can charge libraries higher prices than they 
charge individual subscribers, anticipating those journals sent to libraries will be copied, 
to indirectly capture value from the photocopying.  Liebowitz finds empirical support for 
this hypothesis, but the same likely cannot be said about indirect appropriability as it 
applies to music file sharing.  This is because there is a great variability in the quality of 
copies made from original music files and it is extremely difficult for sellers of original 
music to identify which original recordings will be pirated in order to price discriminate.  
Empirical work has yet to test the effects of indirect appropriability as it applies to file 
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sharing, so it is not clear whether the effect exists in the real world or has a positive 
impact demand for recorded music. 
Thus far, we have outlined three major theoretical considerations that suggest 
piracy has positive influences on demand in the legitimate recorded music market.  As for 
theoretical considerations that suggest piracy has negative influences on revenues in the 
legitimate recorded music market, there exists one: the substitution effect, which is 
widely considered the traditional or conventional view of piracy (Lee 2018).  The 
substitution effect is simple in theory and generally easy to analyze.  The copy is treated 
as a direct substitute of the original, and the consumer faces a decision to either obtain the 
music product legitimately as an original product or obtain a copied version via a file-
sharing network.  The copied product may carry costs with it, namely quality differentials 
and the actual cost of making or obtaining the copy.  If the quality of the copy is identical 
or close in quality to the original product, and the cost to make or obtain the copy is low, 
the copy has a price of zero (Liebowitz 2005).  Compared to the price of the original 
music product, a rational consumer will choose the good with a price of zero to maximize 
utility.  Further, the consumer will have no incentive to purchase the original once they 
have obtained the copied product which carries a positive price, as suggested in the 
sampling theory, because they have obtained an identical or close-to-identical product for 
a price of zero.  This effect is most appropriately modeled as a decrease in demand and 
will thus reduce the quantity sold and price of the good in the legal market, driving 
revenues down.  Empirical evidence analyzing the substitution effect both independently 
and with respect to potential positive influences is numerous, so I will turn to a discussion 
of empirical considerations next to understand which of these effects have been found to 
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dominate in determining the impact piracy has on revenue and sales in the recorded 
music industry. 
 
B. Empirical Considerations 
The empirical literature concerning file sharing and its impact on revenue and 
sales in the music industry has struggled to come to a consensus on which theoretical 
framework dominates in the real recorded music market, i.e. whether positive influences 
outweigh the negative effect of direct substitution.  Previous meta-analyses of existing 
research have come to varying conclusions.  Liebowitz (2005, 2006) finds the overall 
effect is overwhelmingly negative.  Other authors find no consensus in the literature 
(Connolly & Krueger 2006).  Deejan (2009) suggests negative empirical impacts have 
been overestimated and piracy may be beneficial for unknown artists, and Oberholzer-
Gee and Strumpf (2010) conclude file sharing has had a negligible impact on creative 
industries and find no reason to believe file sharing has had a negative impact on supply 
of music.  There is, therefore, a wide range of conclusions about piracy and recorded 
music demand.  Here, I will conduct a review of my own to see if a similar trend emerges 
from analysis of a wide-ranging selection of work done in the field. 
 One of the earliest empirical pieces investigating piracy was conducted by Hui 
and Png (2003).  The authors present theoretical models of end-user and re-seller piracy 
to account for a variety of market factors and then apply the models to international panel 
data of sales volume and an instrument for price for CDs for the period 1994-1998.  
Considering the general difficulty of quantitatively measuring piracy and the 
consideration that pirated quantity, derivable from International Federation of the 
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Phonographic Industry (IFPI) national piracy rates, is endogenously determined in the 
model, the authors develop instrumental variables for CD piracy.  Two groups of 
instruments are used: piracy rates of the closely related information products music 
cassettes and business computer software, and total consumer expenditures and 
unemployment rates.  The rationale for the related piracy rates is that the piracy of those 
products and that of CDs might be motivated by the same environmental factors, and the 
rationale for expenditures and unemployment concerns the alteration of reservation 
utility, a component of the model, via exogenous factors.  Using two-stage least squares, 
the authors find that the coefficient of piracy was negative and marginally significant.  
On a per-capita basis, a one-unit increase in music CD piracy was associated with a 
reduction in demand for legitimate music CDs by 0.42 units.  Expanding this effect out, 
they find that the aggregate recorded music industry lost approximately 6.6% of sales to 
piracy in 1998, assuming prices were not adjusted.  They note this figure is 42% less than 
the figure claimed by the IFPI, suggesting industry organizations are overstating the 
effects of piracy.   
Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004) attempt to add to the empirical literature with their 
own cross-sectional analysis of U.S. CD sales in the period 2000-2001.  Using the 
percentage of adult Internet users who downloaded music files in MP3 format from the 
Internet at least once as a proxy variable for piracy, the authors use a difference-in-
differences approach to estimate a significant negative impact of piracy on CD sales.  
They state that MP3 downloads can even fully account for the decline of CD sales in the 
U.S. market in 2001, depending on the factor of substitutability between MP3s and CDs 
and the multiplier effect of offline piracy.  Peitz and Waelbroeck therefore document a 
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similar negative effect as Hui and Png, although with far different magnitudes, both using 
macro-level data and proxies for piracy. 
Blackburn (2004) takes a different approach to the problem, identifying the strong 
possibility that effects of file sharing on sales of recorded music are unlikely to be 
consistent across artists and incorporating this observation into his analysis.  In particular, 
he notes that the effect of file sharing depends on the ex-ante popularity of the artist in 
question.  Those artists initially unknown can benefit from increased awareness via the 
earlier-discussed network effect, while ex-ante well-known artists are more likely to lose 
sales to downloads as they generally already have an established consumer base.  
Blackburn applies a theoretical analysis including this new effect, which he dubs as the 
awareness effect, to album-level sales and file-sharing network download data over a 
period of 62 weeks in 2002 and 2003, including an artist popularity index developed from 
Billboard’s Hot 200.   
Using two-stage least squares regression and using RIAA legal action as an 
exogenous file sharing risk shock, Blackburn finds on an aggregate level file sharing has 
had approximately zero effect on sales, a surprising finding but one the author regards as 
naïve and incorrect for a variety of reasons.  After interacting ex-ante popularity with file 
sharing downloads and accounting for album competition effects, he finds that ex-ante 
unknown artists are likely to see positive effects on sales from file sharing opposed to ex-
ante popular artists, who likely see negative effects on sales from file sharing.  This 
analysis suggests that on aggregate, considering ex-ante popular artists generally have 
significantly more sales than ex-ante unknown artists, file sharing has large, negative 
impacts on industry sales. 
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Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) offer the most convincing argument that file 
sharing has had negligible impact on sales through an analysis that has garnered 
widespread attention for its surprising results.  The authors use similarly granular data as 
Blackburn (2004), observing sales and file-sharing downloads at the album level.  The 
authors instrument album downloads to account for unobserved album-level 
heterogeneity, such as popularity, that is correlated with both file sharing and sales, thus 
providing a source of bias to the estimator of interest.  The primary instrument used is the 
number of German secondary school kids on vacation in a given week, as the authors find 
an exogenous variation in file sharing strongly associated with school holidays (kids on 
holiday stay at home, where most file sharing takes place, and are typically up later at 
night which allows them to engage in file sharing at peak U.S. hours).  The full 
instrument of downloads includes the holiday instrument in addition to several 
interactions between school vacations and album-specific characteristics to account for 
heterogeneity among albums and the way they are downloaded.   
The authors find that without the instrument, an ordinary least squares estimation 
of their model shows file sharing has a small positive effect on record sales.  After 
instrumenting for downloads in a two-stage least squares regression, the estimated effect 
of file sharing on sales is practically small and statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
Re-specifications and robustness checks support the validity of their model.  Oberholzer-
Gee and Strumpf thus find no evidence to claim the decline in recorded music sales from 
2000 to 2002 was primarily due to file sharing, stating that “while downloads occur on a 
vast scale, most users are likely individuals who in the absence of file sharing would not 
have bought the music they downloaded” (2007). 
18 
 
Rob and Waldfogel (2006) analyze the effects of file sharing using survey data 
collected from 500 college students across four campuses, similar to Zentner (2006) who 
uses European individual-level survey data to develop measures of Internet sophistication 
and access to broadband as instruments for file sharing downloads.  Zentner finds that 
downloads may explain a 30 percent reduction in the probability of buying music and 
suggests a back-of-the-envelope calculation, assuming an identical propensity to consume 
music between downloaders and non-downloaders, that without downloads sales in 2002 
would have been 7.8 percent higher.  Rob and Waldfogel find that an additional album 
download is associated with a decrease in album purchases by 0.2 in their sample, and 
conclude this incomplete sales displacement is supported by the finding that downloaded 
music is valued much less than purchased music.  In a welfare analysis of a subsample, 
the authors find that while downloading reduces expenditures on hit albums by $25 per 
capita, it raises consumers’ welfare associated with the albums by $70 per capita.  They 
find most of this welfare gain of $45 per capita comes from reductions in deadweight loss 
created by copyright law. 
More recent empirical analyses build off this fundamental literature.  Liebowitz 
(2008) empirically examines the extent to which file sharing has caused declines in U.S. 
recorded music sales using a data set of album sales, Internet penetration, and 
demographics from 99 American cities from 1998 to 2003.  He finds using Internet 
penetration, i.e. number of Internet users, as a proxy for file sharing and assuming 
constant average file sharing propensity across the population that a first-differences 
regression estimates a large, statistically significant, negative coefficient on the file 
sharing proxy.  Liebowitz finds the estimate of the reduction in sales due to file sharing, 
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after netting out other generic entertainment impacts of the Internet on record sales, to be 
larger than the actual measured decline in record sales over the period.  This supports the 
claim that without Internet downloading in the period 1998-2003, there would have been 
an increase in record sales close to the historical industry average. 
Hong (2013) applies a difference-in-differences approach to data covering a 
similar period as Liebowitz (2008) from the Consumer Expenditure Survey by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics to determine the effect of file sharing, primarily from Napster, 
on recorded music sales.  Hong takes care to address changes in the composition of 
Internet users as he examines the relationship between household recorded music 
expenditures and household propensity to adopt the Internet to determine the effects of 
file sharing in examining the type of natural experiment that the existence of Napster 
provides.  The author finds that file sharing can account for about 20% in the sales 
decline in recorded music during the Napster period, that is, 1999-2001.  This effect, 
while negative, bears a magnitude consistent with some of the empirical literature 
covering this timeframe and inconsistent with other studies over the same period. 
With album-level data and download data from an anonymous private file-sharing 
network, Hammond (2014) examines the effect of file sharing on album sales, exploiting 
an exogenous variability in the availability of file-sharing data prior to the legitimate 
release of an album, known as a “leak” in the industry.  The main research question 
Hammond investigates is whether an artist should expect legitimate sales to decline given 
wider pre-release availability of the album in file-sharing networks due to the occurrence 
of a leak.  His findings indicate the answer is no, and generally, file sharing is not 
harmful to individual artists.  However, Hammond points out to beware of the fallacy of 
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composition, as this individual-level finding does not necessarily mean file sharing is not 
harmful to the aggregate industry.  Additionally, this study finds file sharing has 
benefited established artists, but not newer, more unknown artists and file sharing trends 
mirror the retail market rather than provide a platform for unknown artists to benefit from 
network effects.  This is a finding contrary to Blackburn (2004) and also Lee (2018). 
Lee (2018) examines a panel dataset of private file-sharing network downloads 
and U.S. sales for 2,109 albums during 2008, controlling for artist popularity as 
Blackburn (2004) noted the importance of.  Lee finds evidence that private-network 
sharing results in decreased album purchases, with a larger effect for digital mediums 
than physical mediums.  Additionally, Lee finds that the effects vary significantly for 
artists of different quality and popularity.  Exogenous increases in file sharing result in 
top-tier artists’ sales decreasing, while the same exogenous effect increases album sales 
for mid-tier artists.  These findings suggest the substitution effect dominates for more 
established artists, while the sampling effect paired with network externalities (dubbed 
“word-of-mouth effect” by Lee) seems to prevail in the case of less popular artists who 
can benefit from increased exposure as sampled information travels through social 
connections and contributes to building a larger fan base.  DiCola (2013) provides survey 
information that offers supplemental evidence to this claim.  In a survey of roughly 5,000 
musicians on how they earn most of their revenue, DiCola found on average, musicians 
earned 12 percent of their revenue from sources directly related to copyright (sound 
recordings), 10 percent from sources with a mixed relationship to copyright (such as 
studio sessions), and 78 percent from sources indirectly related or unrelated to copyright.  
However, for the top income bracket of musicians, 68 percent of revenue was directly 
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related to copyright, 17 percent held a mixed relationship, and 15 percent was indirectly 
related or unrelated.  File sharing is an activity that mainly harms copyright-focused 
revenue, so it is not surprising after examining these survey results that top-tier artists in 
the top income bracket of musicians face the largest negative impacts due to file sharing.  
Meanwhile, lower-tier artists make much less of their income base from copyrighted 
sources, and as such, the sampling and network effects seem to outweigh the substitution 
effect. 
In the mid-2000s, data became available from Apple’s iTunes online music store, 
which provided a useful tool to examine the impact of digital distribution mediums on 
file sharing with granular album sales data.  Waldfogel (2010) examines survey data of 
college students focused on this emerging digital distribution medium.  He finds that the 
level of file sharing still exceeds the level of purchased music, and the rate of sales 
displacement is roughly equivalent to the displacement rate estimated in the period prior 
to the availability of iTunes.  This finding suggests that legal means of digital distribution 
have little impact on stemming illegal file sharing.  Danaher et al. (2012) applies a 
difference-in-difference approach on iTunes data to examine the impact of the passage of 
French anti-piracy law HADOPI, finding that increased consumer awareness of anti-
piracy measures caused iTunes song and album sales to increase 22.5 percent and 25 
percent relative to changes in an international control group.  Additionally, the authors 
find observed sales increase is much higher in genres that were generally pirated more 
prior to the law implementation than genres that experienced less piracy, making a strong 
case for well-formed anti-piracy laws in combating file sharing. 
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Since 1996, concert ticket prices have vastly outpaced inflation.  Krueger 
investigates this trend, suggesting a variety of theories from the superstar effect to 
cartelization in the recorded music industry as possible causes.  He settles on “The Bowie 
Theory” as the most likely cause, which he defines as “the technology-induced erosion of 
the complementarity between record sales and concert tickets” (2005).  As file sharing 
has grown, so have concert ticket prices as technology and file sharing have resulted in 
decreased revenues from recorded music and musicians must now obtain more of their 
income from live performances.  Mortimer et al. (2010) apply empirical analysis to this 
inquiry and find evidence to support this conclusion.  As file sharing and illegal 
redistribution of digital music products has increased in volume and negatively impacted 
associated revenue, musicians must find sources for income elsewhere which we can 
observe in increasing revenue from non-digital complementary products such as live 
performances.  These findings suggest real harm caused by file sharing and a concerted 
effort by musicians to recover lost income from alternative sources. 
Further empirical studies examine changes in supply of music and quality of 
music, extending beyond the typical focus on demand for legitimate recorded music.  
Waldfogel (2011) finds from an empirical analysis of chart-topping albums since the 
1960s that there has been no statistically meaningful difference in the tendency for new 
artists to appear on Pitchfork Media’s best-of album lists since Napster.  While the 
process of music discovery and distribution has changed significantly by the Internet and 
file-sharing technologies, and demand for legitimate music has arguably declined in the 
face of piracy, it appears the supply of new music has not changed significantly at all.  
Perhaps a heightened role of complements helps musicians keep a steady flow of income 
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in the face of reduced recorded music revenue, or perhaps cost reductions have allowed 
the supply of new music to remain steady.  Another possibility for this lack of supply 
change is that quality is decreasing.  However, Waldfogel (2012) finds in another 
empirical analysis this is not the case.  In this study, he constructs three indices to 
represent music quality: one created from lists assembled by various music critics, one 
created from certification-based sales data, and one created from radio airplay data.  
Regressing index levels from periods prior to the arrival of Napster on post-Napster 
levels, he finds no decline in music quality; in fact, in the case of the two usage-based 
indices, recorded music quality seems to increase in the post-Napster period.  This 
finding is puzzling when comparing it to the trend of declining recorded music revenue 
that this paper has been addressing.  A possible explanation Waldfogel suggests is that 
while some new technologies have reduced revenue, other new technologies have 
reduced the cost of bringing new music to market.  This is an element surprisingly absent 
from the empirical literature.  Waldfogel (2017) has recently begun the foray into 
examinations of digitization on the costs of creating copyright-protected media with a 
qualitative analysis that suggests on balance, digitization has increased the number of 
new entertainment products created and made available to consumers.  Perhaps the cost 
reductions are outweighing the revenue reductions well-documented in the empirical 
literature so that on net, technological advancements are improving the welfare of not 
only consumers but producers of often-pirated digital goods.  However, there is a severe 
lack of empirical support for this claim. 
Overall the empirical literature, while still far from consensus, appears to suggest 
that file sharing has a generally negative impact on aggregate recorded music industry 
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sales and revenue.  However, the effects become murkier when the analysis is narrowed 
to the artist level.  File sharing may help relatively unknown artists gain exposure via 
network externalities and build fan bases via a word-of-mouth effect, while harming 
popular artists who have well-established revenue bases.  Additionally, the magnitude of 
these effects varies widely between studies, with some claiming file sharing can explain 
the entire decline in recorded music sales, and others claiming only a fraction of sales lost 
can be attributed to the rise in online piracy.  Variation in magnitude and direction is 
likely a function of the distinct lack of detailed data regarding piracy and file sharing 
which has led to the utilization of a wide variety of proxy variables, instruments, and 
statistical methods that yield somewhat disparate results.  Indeed, my own analysis falls 
victim to this issue with estimated results of piracy, which will be discussed in the 
following sections.  Additionally, most empirical studies on the topic focus primarily on 
sales or revenue.  There is a distinct lack of analysis regarding digitization of music on 
costs, which is a crucial component to measuring profitability and understanding the 
broader welfare effects of file sharing, which is of ultimate interest.   Unfortunately, 
estimating changes in the cost of producing music over time is a challenge which I was 




III. Methodology and Data 
 In my analysis, I am primarily concerned with estimating the effects of 
technological advancement and piracy on recorded music revenue.  The desired 
estimation equations take the following forms: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡  +  𝛽4𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑡 +
 𝛽6𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 +  𝑢𝑡 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡  + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡  + 𝛽4𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑡 +
 𝛽6𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 +  𝑢𝑡 
𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡  + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡  + 𝛽4𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑡 +
 𝛽6𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 +  𝑢𝑡  
Where TotRev signifies total recorded music revenue, PhysRev signifies revenue obtained 
from physical mediums, and DigRev signifies revenue obtained from digital mediums.  I 
include as controls population and income.  I assume that as population increases, more 
individuals will consume music products, and as such must control for population trends 
over time.  I include income as a control because music purchases are likely correlated 
with income levels.  Since music is form of entertainment, I consider it a luxury good as 
opposed to a necessary good.  Economic theory suggests that a rise in income will lead to 
an increase in the consumption of goods and an increase in the consumption of luxury 
goods proportional to necessary goods (Varian 1992).  Further, I assume that luxury 
goods will be purchased with income that is spent at the consumer’s discretion, after 
required expenditures such as income taxes.  Thus, I determine disposable income per 
capita as the most accurate measure of consumer income as it relates to purchases of 






I am concerned primarily with two items: how technological advancement and the 
existence of piracy and file-sharing technologies have impacted revenue earned in the 
aggregate recording music market, represented in the desired estimation equations by 𝛽5 
and 𝛽6.  My hypotheses take the following form: 
 
H1: Technological advancement has contributed to declining revenue in 
the recorded music industry. 
 
H2: Piracy and file sharing have contributed to declining revenue in the 
recorded music industry. 
 
 I hypothesize that technological advancement has facilitated an increase in the 
supply of recorded music.  Without a corresponding increase of equal magnitude in 
demand for recorded music, this supply shift will drive the price of music down and thus 
revenues obtained in the industry.  I believe the fact that technology has allowed music to 
become more widely available from a more diverse set of sources has allowed more 
musicians who previously would not have a platform to release recorded music.  
Additionally, I believe the ease with which music can be uploaded and shared on the 
Internet compared to previous time periods incentivizes musicians to release more 
recorded music.  Thus, I predict these effects have increased the supply of music, an 
effect that will drive revenue down.  This will be observable in the empirical analysis by 
satisfying the following condition: 
𝛽6 < 0 
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 I hypothesize that piracy and file sharing boasts a large substitution effect with 
legitimate recorded music that dominates any positive demand-side effects.  As 
mentioned in Section 2, the literature documents three major impacts of piracy on music 
sales: the sampling effect, network effects, and the substitution effect (Liebowitz 2005, 
2006; Gopal et al. 2006; Peitz & Waelbrock 2004; Hui & Png 2003; Lee 2018).  The 
sampling effect and network effect state that piracy may impact music revenue by 
increasing demand for legitimate music goods.  The substitution effect states that pirated 
music products are direct substitutes of legitimate music products and as such, an 
increase in the availability of pirated music products will decrease demand for legitimate 
music products.  I hypothesize that while the sampling effect and network externalities 
may have positive impacts on demand for recorded music, especially for artists with low 
popularity levels, the substitution effect dominates in magnitude and as such, I should 
observe the following condition in the empirical analysis: 
𝛽5 < 0 
 Technological advancement is generally a difficult variable to define and measure 
in economics due to the lack of concrete metrics and the broad scope of what could be 
considered technological advancement; for the purpose of this analysis I develop a proxy 
for technological advancement which consists of several variables signifying major 
technological improvements in music accessibility throughout the time span of the 
revenue data: the Sony Walkman player, the portable MP3 player, the Apple iPod, 
personal computers (PCs), and smartphones.  For PCs and smartphones, I use global unit 
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sales from 1994 to 2016 and 2007 to 2016, respectively1.  Specific unit sales for 
Walkman players, MP3 players, and iPods were not available due to data limitations and 
as such, dummy variables were assigned.   
The three inventions of the Walkman player, MP3 player, and Apple iPod each 
increased the ease of accessing and listening to music in a mobile fashion, which allowed 
further consumption of music mediums while exercising or traveling.  Personal 
computers ushered in the era of digital music distribution through online platforms such 
as Pandora Radio and iTunes.  More recently, personal computers, in tandem with 
smartphones, have supported the rise of music streaming platforms—such as Spotify and 
Apple Music—that proliferate the market for recorded music today.  Smartphones 
compounded on mobile music accessibility innovations, allowing consumers to carry just 
one device to access all their personal technology needs—including music, with 
applications for all major streaming and video services readily available for download.  
The development of the Apple iPhone was specifically noteworthy, as the synergies 
created between the iPod, iPhone, and Apple’s digital music distribution service of 
iTunes which ran on personal computers allowed seamless integration of music across 
multiple platforms, an advancement that made widespread consumption of music easier 
than ever before. 
 Piracy, or the unauthorized copying of legal music files for personal consumption 
or redistribution, is an illegal activity and thus is difficult to obtain accurate data on or 
measurements of.  In my circumstances, individual file-sharing network data was not 
                                                          
1 Obtained from Gartner. Available PC and smartphone data are global figures while all revenue, 




available, nor were aggregate figures on Internet music file downloading or other copying 
technologies.  To remedy this deficiency, I develop a proxy that consist of four dummy 
variables representing four landmarks in piracy and file-sharing technology: the CD 
burner, the online peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing sites Napster (1999-2001) and 
LimeWire (2000-2010), and the online BitTorrent index The Pirate Bay (2003-present).   
The CD burner is a device that allows the copying of the contents of one CD onto 
a blank CD.  The advent of the CD in 1982 heralded a new era not just for the recorded 
music industry, but for music pirates as the technology enabled master-quality copying in 
large quantities via tools such as CD burners and encoding of MP3 files.  With burners, a 
legitimate music CD could easily be copied onto a pressed copy or a CD-Recordable disc 
(CD-R) for personal use or more widely, distribution to the market for music.  
Additionally, many personal computers came equipped with CD-ripping software and 
CD burners built into the hardware around the turn of the 21st century (Janssens et al. 
2009).  Today, the RIAA permits copying of CDs for strictly personal use, as royalties 
have already been paid on legitimately purchased CDs, but distribution of those copies 
can be considered copyright infringement (2019).  As such, I felt it would be important to 
include as a precursor to the era of digital file-sharing networks and to identify if there 
were noticeable impacts of piracy before the emergence of such networks.   
In 1999, Napster was launched by Shawn Fanning with the intent of allowing 
music files to be shared among strangers (Liebowitz 2006).  It was the first online P2P 
network that specialized in the sharing of MP3 files of music.  P2P file sharing networks 
allow users (peers) to use a software program that locates similar computers in the 
network that carry the file desired and downloads it to a peer’s local computer.  Once 
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obtained, that computer can now be used by other peers in the network as a source for the 
file (Carmack 2005).  Within two short years, Napster faced litigation charges from 
several record labels that are members of the RIAA, supported by separate lawsuits from 
metal band Metallica and rapper and producer Dr. Dre, that ultimately ended the site’s 
primary business model of trading copyrighted material through P2P file sharing (A&M 
Records v. Napster, 2001).  However, Napster had ushered in the advent of P2P file 
sharing networks focused on music files that rapidly diffused across the Internet. 
LimeWire was one of the first offshoot P2P clients that existed until 2010, when it 
was forced to cease operations following a federal injunction (Arista Records LLC v. 
Lime Group LLC, 2010).  I believe LimeWire, as one of the earliest entrants to the file-
sharing market following Napster and longest-standing among the early entrants, was 
significant to the widespread proliferation of file-sharing networks and as such, include it 
as a variable in the model.   
The final piracy dummy variable represents The Pirate Bay, a decentralized index 
of torrent files which supports a regime of P2P file sharing known as BitTorrent.  
BitTorrent is a communication protocol for P2P file sharing that has become the single 
most common protocol on which peers transfer large files such as music.  BitTorrent 
functions similarly to P2P file sharing, however this protocol sources different pieces of 
the file simultaneously from multiple computers in the network.  Additionally, BitTorrent 
uses a principal known as tit-for-tat.  The tit-for-tat principal states that to receive files, a 
peer must contribute files to the network, and the more files shared by a peer, the faster 
that peer’s download speed is (Carmack 2005).  In 2013, BitTorrent was responsible for 
3.35% of worldwide bandwidth, which was more than half of the 6% total worldwide 
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bandwidth occupied by file sharing at the time (Palo Alto Networks).  The Pirate Bay has 
endured litigation and domain seizure, yet the file-sharing site survives through proxy 
servers (Gibbs 2014; Van der Sar 2012, 2015).  A proxy server (proxy) is a computer 
system or application that acts as an intermediary between clients in a computer network 
(Luotonen & Altis, 1994).  Proxies offer a wide range of Internet-based functionalities, 
one of which is acting as a relay between replicated Pirate Bay sites and the main server.  
This functionality has allowed the index to survive sustained legal pressure, and it still 
exists today with a large network of peers and digital files.  Because of The Pirate Bay’s 
network size and resilience, I have chosen it as a variable to represent the current regime 
of file-sharing networks. 
Substituting the developed proxy variables into my desired estimation equations, I 
arrive at three equations to be estimated with the available data: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡  +  𝛽3𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑁𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑊𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑦𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑀𝑃3𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑑𝑡 +  𝛽11𝑃𝐶𝑡 +
 𝛽12𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡 +  𝑢𝑡 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡  + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡  + 𝛽4𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑡 +
 𝛽6𝑁𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑊𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑀𝑃3𝑡 +
 𝛽11𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑑𝑡 +  𝛽12𝑃𝐶𝑡 +  𝛽13𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡 +  𝑢𝑡  
𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡  + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡  + 𝛽4𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑡 +
 𝛽6𝑁𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑊𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑀𝑃3𝑡 +
 𝛽11𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑑𝑡 +  𝛽12𝑃𝐶𝑡 +  𝛽13𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡 +  𝑢𝑡  
Where each 𝛽 is estimated at time t for each variable.  In addition to the data collected to 






revenue for the years spanning 1973 to 2016, obtained from the RIAA.  These numbers 
are adjusted for inflation, measured in 2016 dollars.2  I include as controls U.S. 
population and disposable income per capita3 from the same period, with disposable 
income inflation-adjusted to 2016 dollars. 
 The key estimators of interest in the above equations are the coefficients on the 
piracy proxy variables and the technological advancement proxy variables.  Estimation of 
equation (1) will provide insight on aggregate effects of piracy and technological 
advancement.  Estimation of equations (2) and (3) will provide insight on the effects of 
substitution between physical and digital mediums and the effects of piracy and 
technological advancement on each medium, permitting a more granular analysis.  
Summary statistics for all variables are included in Table 3.1 below.  Graphical visuals of 
non-dummy variables are included in Appendix A. 
  
                                                          
2 I use the Consumer Price Index for all inflation calculations. 





Variable Description Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
TotRev 
Total real revenue in the 
U.S. recorded music 
industry (millions of U.S. 
dollars) 12884.42 4168.67 6955.44 21010.98 
DigRev 
Real revenue generated by 
digital mediums (millions 
of U.S. dollars) 1281.89 1844.23 0 6042.69 
PhysRev 
Real revenue generated by 
physical mediums 
(millions of U.S. dollars) 11602.53 5365.56 1607.86 20468.3 
Income 
Real U.S. disposable 
income per capita (U.S. 
dollars) 33784.42 5617.41 25689.75 43229.31 
Pop U.S. Population (millions) 265.91 34.88 211.91 323.13 
PC 
Global unit sales of 
personal computers 
(millions, 1994-2016) 109.16 129.74 0 365.4 
Smartphone 
Global unit sales of 
smartphones (millions, 
2007-2016) 159.48 388 0 1495.959 
Walkman 
Dummy variable for 
existence of Sony 
Walkman player 0.84 0.37 0 1 
MP3 
Dummy variable for 
existence of portable MP3 
player 0.45 0.5 0 1 
iPod 
Dummy variable for 
existence of Apple iPod 0.36 0.49 0 1 
Burner 
Dummy variable for 
existence of CD burner 0.5 0.51 0 1 
Napster 
Dummy variable for 
existence of Napster 0.09 0.29 0 1 
LimeWire 
Dummy variable for 
existence of LimeWire 0.25 0.44 0 1 
PirateBay 
Dummy variable for 






Table 4.1 displays the results of ordinary least squares regression of equation (1) 
in column (1).  Upon testing for heteroskedasticity, an F-statistic of 2.22 was returned 
with a p-value of 0.037, indicating heteroskedasticity at the 5% level.  As such, equation 
(1) was estimated with robust errors, which is included in column (2).  Using the AR(1) 
model, no serial correlation was found.  However, a RESET test indicated slight 
misspecification at the 5% level, with ŷ2 returning a p-value of 0.048 and ŷ3 returning a p-
value of 0.045.  Attempts to fix model misspecification by logging variables were 
unsuccessful, thus misspecification may be a result of observed heteroskedasticity [in 
which case, then should not be an issue by using robust errors as done in specification 
(2)] or a result of omitted variable bias. 
Specifications (1) and (2) confirm my H1: all technological advancement proxy 
variables have strong negative coefficients and are all statistically significant at the 5% 
level besides MP3.  For example, an increase of one million PCs sold is associated with a 
decrease of $64.7 million in total recorded music revenue, ceteris paribus.  Robust errors 
yield similar statistical significance results, with MP3 now significant at the 10% level.  
Specifications (1) and (2) failed to confirm my H2: the piracy proxy variables 
returned ambiguous coefficients.  While Limewire returned a negative coefficient as 
hypothesized, Burner, Napster, and PirateBay returned positive coefficients of varying 
degrees of magnitude.  Additionally, none of the estimators were significant at the 5% 





Effects on Total Recorded Music Revenue 
Variables (1) (2) 
Income 
.452                 
(.3217) 






























































R2 .9393 .94 
F-stat 39.97 194.47 




(*) ρ < 0.1 
(**) ρ < 0.05 




 Estimation of equation (2) using ordinary least squares resulted in a model that 
was heteroskedastic at the 1% level with a F-statistic of 4.26 and mis-specified through 
the RESET test at the 1% level, with ŷ2 returning a F-statistic of 4.44 and ŷ3 returning a 
F-statistic of -4.10.  As such, I will not discuss this model, though it is included in 
Appendix B.  Indeed, some of the estimators are interesting; however statistical tests are 
unreliable, and the model is of dubious functional form. 
Table 4.2 displays the results of ordinary least squares regression of equation (3).  
This specification was not heteroskedastic, was not serially correlated, and maintained 
functional specification at the 5% level by the RESET test.  As in specifications (1) and 
(2) in Table 4.1, the technological advancement proxy variables carried consistently 
negative estimators that are all significant at the 1% level, besides MP3.  For example, a 
one-million-unit increase in smartphones sold is associated with a decrease of $5.79 
million in recorded music revenue generated through sales of physical mediums, holding 
all else constant including recorded music revenue generated by digital mediums.  This 
DigRev control indicates that these technological advancements are not just causing 
consumers to substitute music purchases towards digital mediums, which could be 
inferred from Table 4.1, and instead directly associated with declining revenue. 
Additionally, the coefficient on DigRev is interesting: an increase of $1 million in 
revenue generated by digital mediums is associated with a decrease of $2.1 million in 
revenue generated by physical mediums, ceteris paribus.  This suggests a 
disproportionate effect in the substitution to digital mediums away from physical 























































(*) ρ < 0.1 
(**) ρ < 0.05 




Indeed, if the price of a digital unit of music is lower than the price of a physical unit of 
music, the substitution of a digital unit of music for a physical unit of music would have a 
net negative effect, as the revenue lost from the foregone purchase of the physical 
medium would outweigh the revenue gained from the purchase of the digital medium.  
The coefficient on DigRev suggests that, on aggregate, an increase in revenue from 
digital products is associated to a disproportionate decrease in revenue for physical 
products.  This finding seems to confirm the tertiary hypothesis that the price of a unit of 
music from a digital medium is less than the price of a unit of music from a physical 
medium and is contributing towards downward pressure on overall recorded music 
revenue. 
 Table 4.2 also displays ambiguous results of piracy on recorded music sales, as 
observable in Table 4.1.  While Limewire and PirateBay return negative coefficients, 
Burner and Napster return positive coefficients, and none of the estimators are 
statistically significant.  It may be the case in both Tables 4.1 and 4.2 that PC is picking 
up some omitted variable bias attributable to piracy.  The estimator on PC may include 
effects associated with piracy, as the increase in availability of piracy technology via file-
sharing networks is directly correlated with the rising ubiquity of personal computers in 
the American household, and the selected piracy proxies may not be adequately 
controlling for piracy effects due to the loose fit of the dummy variables.  However, this 
is not an observable phenomenon in this analysis and I find no strongly supported 
empirical evidence to confirm my H2 that piracy is associated with declining recorded 





Through the empirical analysis presented in this paper, I can confirm the 
hypothesis that technological advancement has contributed to declining revenue in the 
music industry, but I cannot confirm the hypothesis that piracy has contributed to 
declining revenue.  My empirical analysis suggests the presence of prominent copying 
technologies and file-sharing networks has had an ambiguous and potentially negligible 
effect on recorded music revenue.  This finding can be contrasted with the literature 
review conducted, which largely suggests that piracy has negative effects on aggregate 
revenue in the music industry.  However, as there are complicating effects when 
examining the industry at the artist level—some artists may benefit from piracy 
dependent on their status and popularity, while others are harmed—piracy effects seem to 
differ dependent on the scope of the analysis.  Additionally, magnitudes of estimated 
impacts have a broad spread, making it difficult to estimate a true monetary loss to 
piracy.  The disparity in magnitudes raises questions about the validity of piracy studies 
conducted by the recorded music industry.  Another issue is the distinct lack of empirical 
analysis of the impact of digitization and file sharing on the costs of producing and 
distributing music—this consideration is essential to understand how digitization has 
affected profitability and welfare.  The rise of digital distribution has complicated the 
narrative, especially considering the meteoric rise of streaming platforms that offer 
unlimited access to a massive base of music for relatively low monthly subscription fees 
such as Apple Music or Spotify.  These services may prove to disrupt file sharing much 
more than previous digital distribution mediums such as iTunes; however, this is an 
untouched topic in the empirical literature so far.  In conclusion, while the existing 
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literature can make somewhat consistent causal inferences regarding the general welfare 
of consumers and musicians under increased music piracy, the data currently available is 
likely not detailed enough to make an accurate causal inference regarding the impact of 
broader technological advancement on the welfare of musicians through the lens of 
profitability and producer surplus.  Thus, to assemble an accurate picture of the effect 
technological advancement and the rise of digital distribution have had on the broader 
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